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RECEIVERS FOR COTENANTS.
THE appointment of receivers in partition suits and in other
actions between cotenants is an exercise of jurisdiction which is
of much importance in view of the landed and moneyed interests
often involved. An investigation of the authorities reveals also
that there are many elements and considerations of legal conse-
quence developed by the cases in which this power of the courts is
discussed.
The power to appoint receivers of the common property at the
instance of one of the cotenants has been characterized as an
extraordinary one, which the court should not exercise except in
the clearest cases : Low v. Holmes, 14 N. J. Eq. 148. See also
IXorway v. Rowe, 19 Yes. 159; Sc trah v. Seurra, 14 Jur.
847; Spratt v. Ahearne, 1 Jones Ir. Exc. 50. Hence we find it
laid down that the court will not grant a receiver against a tenant
in common in possession, at the suit of another tenant in common,
unless in cases of destructive waste or gross exclusion : Kerr on
Receivers 106. See also to same effect ETx parte Billinghmrst,
Amb. 164; -x parte Radcliffe, 1 J. & W. 619. So in the case
of Verplank et als. v. Nines et ua., 1 Johns. Ch. 57, Chancellor
KENT says : "The exercise of this power (to appoint a receiver)
must depend upon sound discretion, and in a case in which it must
appear fit and reasonable that some indifferent person, under
approved security, should receive and distribute the issues and
profits, for the greater safety of all parties concerned.
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Despite these restrictions the power to appoint a receiver in a
partition suit has been recognised and enforced in England from an
early date. In Evelyn v. Evelyn, 2 Dickens Ch- Rep. 800, a
receiver was appointed to an undivided estate.
So in Street v. Anderton. 4 Brown's Ch. Rep. 305, the lord
chancellor ordered that the cotenant, who, according to the state-
ment of counsel in Archdeacon v. Bowes, 3 Anst. 752, had taken
more than his share of the profits, should give security to account
for one-third of the rents, otherwise the order to go for a receiver.
So also Calvert v. Adams, 2 Dick. 478. It has been remarked
of the early English cases that there is no indication of the ground
of the decisions : Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, sect. 327.
But in Milbanc v. Bevett, 2 Merivale 404, it was held that the
court refuses to grant a receiver of estates, as between tenants in
common, except in gross cases of exclusive possession. See also
Brown's Ch. Rep. 35, note. Another instance is afforded by
Holmes v. Bell, 2 Beav. 298, where a receiver was appointed at
the instance of a party seeking to foreclose a mortgage against
both cotenants, one of whom was in possession of the whole rents.
But there are more recent instances of such appointments.
Thus in _largrave v. llargrave, 9 Beav. 549, a receiver was ap-
pointed to take possession of a moiety of an estate, claimed by
plaintiff as tenant in common with the defendant who was in pos-
session of the whole. The contest was between parties claiming
to be heirs; the plaintiff being an infant whose legitimacy was
disputed.
So in Sandford v. Ballard, 33 Beav. 401, a receiver of the
whole property was granted at the hearing as between tenants in
common, there being evidence that the defendant, one of them,
had excluded the rest. The application had previously been
denied, except as to plaintiff's moiety, for want of proof of such
exclusion. See same case, 30 Beav. 109.
It will be noted that in several of the cases it was regarded as
indispensable that there should be an exclusion of the cotenant:
Sandford v. Ballard, supra; M'filbank v. Bevett, supra. Yet it
has been laid down that even in such cases there is room for other
remedies. Thus it is stated that it was doubtful whether a court
of equity would appoint a receiver even in the case of an exclu-
sion of one tenant in common by another. For if it were an
exclusion which amounted to an ouster at law, the party complain-
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ing was bound to assert at law his legal title. Again, if it were
not such an exclusion, a court of equity would compel the tenant
in common to account for the rent to his companion, but would not
act against his legal right to possession, for the reason that the
party complaining might at law relieve himself by the writ of par-
tition: Tyso v. Pai'clough, 2 Sim. & Stu. 143, per Sir JOHN
LEACH, 2U. R. But it is said of these remarks that they do not
seern to be borne out by the cases, if indeed they have not been
misunderstood. See Seafle v. ,S'males, 3 W. R. 437; Kerr on
Receivers 115.
So the American case of Low v. Holmes, 17 N. J. Eq. 148,
though not attempting to go as far as the case last cited, also holds
that there is no ground for the appointment of a receiver, unless
the complainant is by the act of his cotenant excluded from the
enjoyment of his share of the property.
But in many of the American cases more liberal views of the
functions of courts of equitable jurisdiction 'prevail. Thus in
the case of Rutkeiford, Receiver, Jic., v. Jones, 14 Ga. 521, which
was a bill for partition, the court say: "But equity can do more,
than seems to be imagined by those who have instituted this pro-
ceeding. It can not only direct a sale of some of the lots and a
partition of some of the others, in whole lots or in parcels, and
decree compensation to equalize the allotments, but it can appoint
a eeceiver to rent out this property, the whole or any part of it,
and pay over the profits to the cotenants, according to their
respective rights and interests. Yea, it may do more than this;
it can order any one or more of these twenty-five lots to be held
and enjoyed for a certain length of time by one of the cotenants,
and then by the other, and so on successively."
This question of the equitable control over such appointments,
recently underwent a thorough discussion in the case of Goodale v.
The Fifteenth DJitet 6ourt et al., decided by the Supreme Court
of California, Sept. 22d 1880, and now reported in 56 Cal. 26.
In the state in which the controversy arose, the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides for the appointment of receivers in certain specified
instances pertaining to mortgages, partnerships, judgments, insol-
vent corporations, &c. Finally it is declared that receivers may
be appointed in all other cases where receivers have heretofore been
appointed by the usages of courts of equity. The contest as to the
construction of this last provision arose in this wise: a suit of
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partition was brought in the court below, and an interlocutory de-
cree entered therein, and three referees were appointed to make
partition of the lands in controversy. Subsequently an order was
made appointing a'receiver with power to take possession of the
lands and lease them in parcels, to collect the rents, issues and
profits of the lands pending the action, and therefrom to pay the
taxes and such other expenses as the court might direct, as well as
to exercise the powers and duties of receiver in like cases. This
action of the court below was reviewed on certiorari. The princi-
pal opinion notes that from the manner in which the case came
before the appellate court, the question involved was one of juris-
diction only, and that court was not called upon to inquire into the
correctness of the order.of the court below. Indeed in the argu-
ment of the petitioners (it was pointed out) this was admitted, and
the following language used: "We do not ask the court to inquire
into the sufficiency of the. proofs upon which the court below
founded its action,' nor to inquire into any mistakes of law or fact
which the court may have possibly fallen into in the course of its
consideration of the case -before it, but whether it had any right to
consider it at all, whether it had any right in a case of this impres-
sion to reach that result at all." In other words, is it competent
for a court in any particular suit, to appoint a receiver to take pos-
session of the property, collect the rents, pay the taxes, lease the
property, &c. It very clearly appears that a suit in partition is an
equitable proceeding, because it is not competent for a court of law
to carry into effect the various and complicated provisions of the
statute on the subject.
After reviewing the authorities, the opinion proceeds: "The fore-
going cases show that it is competent for a court of equity, in some
cases, to grant a receiver in partition suits, and we can readily un-
derstand why such a power should be vested in the court. Take,
for example, the case of a mine containing precious metals. It is
in the possession of one tenant in common and is being worked by
him to the exclusion of the other cotenants. He is insolvent and
unable to respond in damages. Here we have a case in which the
value of the property is being rapidly exhausted by an irresponsible
cotenant, and the cotenants out of possession are threatened with
an entire destruction of their estate. " Would it not be eminently
just and proper for the court in which a suit was pending for the
partition of such property to wrest it from the possession of the
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tenant holding and working it, and to put it into the hands of a,
receiver ? Or suppose the estate consisted of land, the only value
of which was in the timber upon it, and the tenant in possession
was cutting down and disposing of such timber and appropriating
the proceeds to his own use. He is insolvent too and unable to
respond in damages. Would it not be within the jurisdiction of a
court of equity in which a suit for the partition of such land was
pending, to appoint a receiver to take possession of the property
and hold it for the joint benefit of all parties in interest ? It seems
to us that it would. It is sufficient for us to hold that there are
cases of this impression in which it is competent for the court to
appoint a receiver."
A special concurring opinion in substance adhered to the opinion
of the majority, because in some cases of partition a receiver may
be appointed, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, and it
therefore did not ap)pear that the court exceeded its jurisdiction.
But it would be otherwise if it had been made manifest, as was
claimed to be the fact, that there were several persons owning the
entire estate as tenants in common, all acting in good faith, and for
the common interest, and a receiver had been appointed to take
possession of the land as against them, and authority had been
given to such receiver to turn out of possession a tenant in common
who had properly preserved his share of the property and had not
done or suffered any act inconsistent with the rights of his coten-
ants. There was also a dissenting opinion to the effect that by the
usages of courts of equity, receivers were never appointed in other
than equity cases, of which the action of partition, under the local
statute, was not one, it being rather a special proceeding. The
ground was further taken that it was a fallacy to hold that because
courts of equity did appoint receivers in some cases of partition,
therefore the jurisdiction of the court to appoint one could not be
questioned in this instance for the statute referred to cases, not to
actions, wherein equity usages could be invoked, and no such ex-
ceptional case had been shown. These opinions, though based on
local regulations, have been presented in detail because they so
thoroughly open up the entire field of controversy. The sugges-
tion of the principal opinion, that a receiver would be properly ap-
pointed in cases where the cotenant working the mischief is insol-
vent, is sustained in the case of Williams et al. v. Jenkins, 11
Ga. 595. There the court says, "The plaintiff herein insists that
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a court of equity will not interfere and appoint a receiver at the
instance of one tenant in common against another, who is in pos-
session, because the party complaining may relieve himself at law
by a writ of partition. This position is evidently taken in confor-
mity with the views advanced in Tyjson v. -arelough, supra.
Concede that the complainant in this case might have a writ of
partition at law for his share of the property, what adequate rem-
edy has he at law in the meantime for the profits of the mills, while
in the possession of the defendants who are insolvent ? We enter-
tain no doubt that a court of equity has jurisdiction to appoint a
receiver at the instance of one tenant in common against his co-
tenants, who are in possession of undivided valuable property,
receiving the whole of the rents and profits, and excluding their
companion from the receipt of any portion thereof, when such ten-
ants are insolvent. See to same effect 2 Wait's Prac. 216. So in
Ware v. Ware, 42 Ga. 408, the appointment of a receiver was
directed against an insolvent party who had misappropriated funds
which should have been so invested as to secure to the complainant
an undivided interest in certain lands.
But in regard to the disposal of rents, it is not always made a
pre-requisite that the cotenant controlled should be insolvent.
When in an action for partition it is shown that a portion of the
property cannot be rented, in consequence of the refusal of one of
the tenants in common to unite with the others, and that the rents
of the remaining portions cannot be collected because of the inter-
ference of such cotenants, a receiver may be appointed to preserve
the property from loss pendente lite: .Pinolet v. Bushe, 28 How.
Pr. 9.
Again, the aid of a receiver is sometimes granted in action for
the partition of real estate between tenants in common, when it is
apparent to the court that the relief is necessary to protect all par-
ties in interest, and in such an action, when the defendants not
only deny the plaintiff's title, but have endeavored to entangle the
whole title, and not disposed to account for the rents and profits,
equity may interfere by a receiver : .Dunean v. Carnpau, 15 Mich.
414, per CAMPBELL, J. ; High on Receivers, sect. 607.
Another instance in which a receiver of the property of coten-
ants is appointed, is based upon the analogy of partnership cases.
When the interest which the parties have in the land is held for the
purposes of trade, and their relation to each other resembles that
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of partners, a receiver may be appointed, though the facts would
not justify that action if the parties -were ordinary tenants in com-
mon. So when a party was interested in unimproved city lots
jointly with another who held the legal title and died, having given
his executors a power of sale, it was held that the power was subject
to the control of the court for the benefit of such party, and a re-
ceiver may be appointed: Marvin v. Drexel's Ex"rs, 18 P. F.
Smith 362.
A colliery or a mine is irn the nature of a trade, and where differ-
ents persons have interests in it, it is to be regarded as a partnership.
Therefore, when there are several shares, as each partner cannot
employ a separate manager or set of workmen, the court will ap-
point a manager or receiver for them all, under the same circum-
stances which would justify such appointment in the case of a
regular copartnership: Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition,
sect. 327, citing Jefferys v. Smith, 1 Jacob & W. 298 ; Feredayj v.
Wightwick. 1 Russ. & M. 46.
Of course the case is still stronger where the purchaser of a
mining claim at judicial sale is the applicant and the defendant is
the judgment-debtor, who remains in possession working the claim
and rapidly exhausting it, and is insolvent. The working of the
mines, and the extraction of the gold therefrom, is something more
than the common ordinary use of real estate by one in posses-
sion, and requires more than the ordinary remedies to protect the
rights of the purchaser: lHill v. Taylor, 22 Cal. 193, 194. See
also Roberts v. Ebertardt, Kay 159, where Lord HATHERLEY ex-
plains that the co-ownership or partnership may be in the working
or in the land.
As in the case of tenants in common, so in actions between joint
tenants, a receiver will be appointed, as a matter of course, when
the joint property is in danger through the acts of one or more of
the joint tenants: 2 Wait's Pr. 216.
In case some of the tenants in common are infants, a receiver
may be appointed, with directions to pay such as are of age their
share of the rents; and if one of the infants becomes of age after
the appointment of a receiver, he may apply for the payment of
his share to himself: Smith v. Sister, 4 Beav. 227; Bamsden v.
Fairthorl), 1 N. R. 389.
It will be perceived on a consideration of the authorities dis-
cussed, that the extraordinary power to appoint a receiver is but
RECEIVERS FOR COTENANTS.
rarely exercised, but is invoked in cases of exclusion from the
premises or the rents thereof, of obstruction to the collection of the
rents, of attempts to entangle the title, and of practical copartner-
ship in mines which are being worked to exhaustion; and that in
all cases of insolvency of the mismanaging tenant aggravates the
case and perfects the grounds of the application. But pending a
suit for the sale of lands for division among cotenants, equity will
not, by appointing a receiver, interfere with the lawful possession
of one of the cotenants, who is not sh(wn to dispute the title or to
disturb the possession of his cotenants; especially if there is no
sufficient averment of insolvency : Cassetty v. Capps, 3 Tenn. Oh.
524.
But what constitutes exclusion in the sense intended by the
cases which require such conduct? The answ.er will be apparent
from a few illustrations. It constitutes an exclusion when the
tenant in common receives the whole rents and profits and refuses to
pay over to the other the share due to him : Sandford v. Ballard,
33 Beav. 401. A peculiar instahce of exclusion is given in the
notes to 4 Bro. 0. 0. 414, of an anonymous case. where a receiver
was appointed on the motion of a younger brother, whom the elder
brother and heir declined to treat as a tenant in common upon the
ground that he was intoxicated when he made the agreement of
compromise which created such cotenancy. But wheu a tenant
in common advertised the estate for sale, and gave notice to the
tenants to pay their rents to him alone, an application for a
receiver was denied on the ground that the conduct complained of
did not amount to an exclusion : Tyson v. aircelough, 2 Sim. &
Stu. 142.
The rule in regard to an exclusion is equally applicable to a
tenancy in common in equitable estates, and if there be no
exclusion, a receiver may be appointed of the applicant's share:
Sandford v. Ballard, supra. The other grounds for the appoint-
ment of receivers for cotenants have been sufficiently explained.
It is to be noted, however, that the alternative of giving security
may be offered to the offending cotenant. Thus, where personal
property is in the exclusive possession of one of the cotenants
who refuses to divide or sell it, or to allow his cotenant to par-
ticipate in its enjoyment, a receiver may be appointed, unless the
defendant gives adequate security to reimburse the plaintiff for the
deterioration or destruction of the property by use, and compen-
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sate him for the value of the beneficial enjoyment of such pro
perty: Low v. Holmes, 17 N. J. Eq. 150. See, also, Delaware,
s;e., Railroad Co. v. Erie, 6 C. E. Green 298. So the court may
order the tenant in common. in possession to give security for the
payment of the due proportion of the rents to his cotenants : Street
v. Anderton, 4 Bro. 0. C. 414.
As between tenants in common of personal property, the courts
are usually averse to appointing a receiver over the joint property
upon the application of one cotenant against the other: Low v.
Iolmes, 2 C. E. Green 148. And one cotenant cannot, on the
ground of a refusal of the other to divide the property, maintain a
bill in equity for a receiver and for a sale and division, when it is
not shown that the chattels were agreed to be or were used in car-
rying on any business for the joint benefit of the parties, as part-
ners or otherwise ; or that the tenancy in common was of such a
nature as to require a sale of the chattels or a termination of the
tenancy ; and when it does not appear that there is any necessity
for the division of the property on account of the death or insol-
vency of one of the cotenants. And this is true, even though the
bill charges the defendant with having the sole and exclusive use
of the property, and that he is diminishing its value and refuses to
make a division thereof; since the remedy for such grievances, if
they amount to a conversion of the property, must be sought by an
action at law : High on Receivers, sect. 20 ; Blood v. Holmes, 110
Mass. 546. So in the case of joint-owners of the machinery and
material of a printing office, upon a bill by one joint-owner or
tenant in common against the other for a partition of the property,
which is in defendant's possession, the court will, as already noted,
refuse a receiver if the defendant in possession will give adequate
security for the rents and profits I)endente lite: Low v. Blood, 2
C. E. Green 148. In case of the dissolution of a partnership by
proceedings in bankruptcy against one member of the firm, the
assignees of the bankrupt partner become, as to his interest, ten-
ants in common with the solvent partner. And in such a case,
upon an application of a receiver on the ground of exclusion, a
court of equity will proceed upon the same principles by which it
is governed in all cases where some members of a firm seek to
exclude others from that share in the management of the busi-
ness to which they are entitled: Wilson v. Greenwood, 1 Swans.
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